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This research examines the effect of a particular non-monetary incentive on the retention 
of active duty Brazilian Air Force colonels. The objective is to provide evidence to 
support the Brazilian Air Force Manpower decision makers in establishing policies 
regarding the selection of colonels for a career course. The characteristics of the 
incentives and the links to Expectancy Theory were reviewed to frame the hypotheses.  
Using two sources of data from the Brazilian Air Force manpower databanks, 
logit regressions and descriptive statistics were analyzed to check the validity of the 
hypothesis and found overall that the selection of colonel for a career course (defined in 
Brazilian law as prerequisite for promotion) is strongly correlated with retention 
probability. Furthermore, the interaction between the selection for the course and the 
information the military receives from the performance appraisal system plays a 
significant role in retirement decisions. 
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All organizations to be successful need to manage four different types of assets: 
physical assets, financial assets, human assets, and intellectual properties. Although all 
are important, it is the human asset that will guide the others to the organization to 
achieve its goal (Mathis, Jackson, & Valentine, 2014). Similarly, the Força Aérea 
Brasileira (FAB) understands that the institution is composed of aircrafts, doctrines, 
buildings, equipment, and human resources, but recognizes, when establishing its values, 
that it is composed of “the men and women that ultimately were responsible for putting 
the institution in the current stage of development, as well as being responsible for 
deciding the future of the Air Force.”1 The Air Force, however, faces problems related to 
shortage of staff in many different ranks and specializations. Among these, the retention 
of colonels deserves special attention for several reasons: (a) the problem (lack of 
personnel) is more grievous in this rank; (b) the organizational structure is arranged for 
several key functions to be exercised by these officers; and (c) from this pool of colonels, 
the leaders (general officers) of the FAB will be chosen in the near future. The present 
research examines the information available in the databases of FAB and determines 
whether the administration of a particular incentive (selection for career course) has been 
effective in increasing retention of colonels on active duty. 
A. BACKGROUND 
To better understand the problem, which is discussed in the subsequent chapters, 
this section provides some basic concepts about the FAB’s organization. First, I present 
how the military career is structured based on the current legislation. Next, I discuss the 
Curso de Política e Estratégia Aeroespaciais (CPEA) and how it inserted itself into the 
context of career progression. I then review the problems that manpower decision-makers 
face in establishing policies regarding CPEA’s selection process. Finally, the section 
concludes with an overview of how the performance appraisal system and performance 
1 Translated from the institutional site of Brazilian Air Force (available at 
www.fab.mil.br/institucional). 
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feedback work in that Air Force culture and how they might be playing a role in this 
context. 
1. Career Flow 
The career flow for the FAB’s officers is governed by a series of laws and 
regulations observed in this study and briefly explained in Table 1. The way that the 
officer’s career is structured contributes, to some extent, to the officer’s attrition, which 
occurs mostly in the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, aggravating the problem of 
unfulfilled billets in the functions of O-6. According to Decree 8209, the FAB is manned 
with approximately 9,500 officers divided into 19 different specialties (Corps). Only five 
Corps have access to ranks of generalship and therefore are the focus of this research. 
They are aviators, engineers, infantries, stewardships, and physicians. 
Table 1.   Legislation that Governs Career Flow in the Brazilian Air Force 
Constituição 
05 Out 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution (October 5, 1988) 
Lei 6880 
06 Dez 1980 Military Statute (December 6, 1980) 
Lei 5821 
10 Nov 1972 
Promotions’ Law for active duty officers in Brazilian Armed 
Forces (November 10,1978) 
Dec 7099 
04 Fev 2010 
Promotions’ Regulation for Brazilian Air Force officers 
(February 14, 2010) 
Port 92/GC3 
14 Fev 2007 
Establishes the prerequisites for promotion for officers in 
Brazilian Air Force (February 14,2007) 
MP 2215 
31 Ago 2001 Military Pay Act (August 31,2001) 
Lei 11320 
06 Jul 2006 
Establishes the limits of manpower to be observed by the 
Brazilian Air Force (July 6, 2006) 
Dec 8209 
21 Mar 2014 
Define the authorized billets in the current year according to rank 
and Corps (March 21, 2014) 
TCA 37–3 
13 Jan 2015 
Tabulates the courses offered by the Department of Education 
(January 13, 2013) 
 
The Military Pay Act stipulates that any military member may request retirement 
after completing 30 years of service. In that condition he is transferred to the reserves of 
that branch in the same rank as he held previously, receiving full compensation. Before 
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that, the military member has the right to leave active duty by quitting. In this case he is 
also transferred to the reserve of that branch in the last position he held, but he is not 
entitled to any pay compensation. In this case, for retirement purposes, he will be under 
the rules of the institution he decided to shift. 
The Promotions’ Law dictates that the officer shall to stay a minimum time at 
each rank to acquire a certain level of experience before being promoted, so that, 
although there are slight variations from person to person, the officer on average achieves 
the minimum expected time to retirement as an experienced O-5 to a recently promoted 
O-6. Therefore, policies to increase retention in the rank of colonel have required special 
attention from the human resources decision makers. 
The Promotions’ Regulation states that the institution should foster a regular and 
balanced career flow. For this sake, the Air Force High Command annually convenes to 
decide the promotion to the ranks of general officers. Ideally, colonels should remain in 
this position (O-6) for a period of five years, at which time the colonels are judged by the 
High Command and then should leave the rank either by promotion or retirement. 
2. CPEA 
The CPEA, Course of Aerospace Policy and Strategy, is a course defined by the 
Ordinance 92/GC3 as a prerequisite for promotion to the rank of brigadier. The course is 
ministered by the Air Force Command and Staff College, Escola de Comando e Estado 
Maior da Aeronáutica (ECEMAR), located in the city of Rio de Janeiro. It is oriented for 
active duty colonels belonging to the Corps with access to generalship and its main 
purpose is to provide the knowledge applicable to the performance of higher-level 
functions in the Air Force. 
The Air Force Department of Education, Departamento de Ensino da Aeronáutica 
(DEPENS), is the organism responsible to plan and execute the military education 
process regarding the graduation, post-graduation, and specialization phases. The CPEA 
is classified as a Course of High-Studies, which, according to the TCA 37–3, is defined 
as a modality of teaching that aims to qualify senior officers and similar civilians’ 
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employees to exert functions that require specific knowledge, skills, and aptitudes proper 
of the Air Force high-management. 
According to the DEPENS, the CPEA provides students with learning 
experiences that enable them to: 
• Contribute with the formulation and conduction of aerospace and national 
defense policies. 
• Participate in the formulation and conduction of strategic-military and 
institutional planning in the Air Force. 
• Plan institutional management systems in complex organizational contexts 
within the Air Force.  
• Assess conjunctural factors and historic events, of general and military 
character, applicable to the performance of the highest-level functions in 
the Air Force.2 
The course constitutes a workload of approximately 1,500 hours delivered over 41 
weeks in a fully dedicated academic regimen, which when combined with the two months 
usually spent on the movements in and out, comprises approximately one year of absence 
from military, operational, and administrative activities. 
3. The Problem 
As seen, the FAB faces problems related to lack of personnel and the point where 
the problem is more grievous (i.e., observed as many unfulfilled billets) is the rank of 
colonel as a result of the way in which the career flow is structured. In fact, the 
legislation provides the officers with the possibility to retire after completion of 30 years 
in service, which usually occurs between the last years of lieutenant colonel’s service to 
the earliest years as colonel. This explains the natural increase of evading officers 
immediately after they reach this stage in their career. 
One of the incentives for the colonel to remain on active duty after completing 30 
years of service is undoubtedly the possibility of promotion to the rank of brigadier. This 
promotion is expected to be pursued by some officers since it carries great challenges and 
besides, obviously the status and benefits that come. 
2 Translated from the TCA 37-3/2015 (available at 
https://www.ciear.aer.mil.br/site/images/documentos/tca_37_3.pdf). 
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According to the Military Statute, the officers are divided in three distinct circles 
(junior officers, senior officers, and general officers). Therefore, the promotion to 
generalship constitutes a jump in the hierarchical structure. The importance given to this 
promotion is also clearly noticed in the Federal Constitution that determines a president’s 
responsibility to nominate private positions and promote the general officers. Finally, 
even though the compensation differences could be considered not so vast (around 10% 
increase in basic pay) it is important to remember that the pay levels are maintained 
during the retirement. Considering that the CPEA is a legal prerequisite for the colonel 
run for promotion, the selection for that course should also be considered as an incentive. 
Annually an internal organ called Comissão de Promoções de Oficiais (CPO), 
Officers Promotions Board, convenes to conduct the selection process of the Colonels for 
the CPEA. To foster the desirable regular and balanced career flow, the Board usually 
judges one cohort per year. The Promotions Board has the incumbency to discuss the job 
performance presented by the officers belonging to the cohort on the scope and select the 
colonels with the greatest merit to do the course, within the number of places stipulated 
by the Air Force Command. 
The issue is that the organs that manage human resources in the FAB annually 
should dictate the number of vacancies to be filled by the CPEA for each cohort 
according to the interests of the Air Force. These numbers must be chosen within a range 
that varies between two extremes: 
• The Promotions’ Law establishes that the Air Force Command shall 
present to President of Republic a list containing a minimum number of 
colonels satisfying the prerequisites for promotion, regarding the number 
of billets to be fulfilled in the ranks of generals. So the projections of 
vacancies and attritions lead to the minimum number of colonels to be 
selected to the CPEA. 
• The number of places cannot extrapolate the capacity dictated by the 
ECEMAR as a function of its infrastructure capacity.  
The question surrounding this decision-making is that although the purpose of the 
course is to prepare officers for performance tasks as general officers, the institution 
cannot ignore the fact that the CPEA is an incentive that plays a significant role in an 
officer’s retention. 
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Thus, the decision-maker faces the following dilemma: Choosing too many 
officers for the CPEA diverts too many colonels from administrative, operational, and 
military functions, so that colonels become exclusively devoted to academic activities for 
one year. Failure to select officers for the CPEA can generate demotivation and 
exacerbate the existing problem of retention. 
Thus, according to Bardach (2012), after a problem is defined, the second step to 
analyze the best policy to adopted is to gather some data that could be turned into 
evidence; so within the uncertain environment, it would be possible in the future to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis of how each alternative might be desirable. In other words, 
for the human resources organs to be able to adopt policies aligned with the interests of 
the institution regarding the CPEA, they need to know with greater accuracy about the 
impact that selecting a colonel for the course has on his decision to anticipate his request 
for retirement. 
Authorities responsible for managing human resources in FAB had already 
observed from data that the attrition rates of officers who fail to be selected for the CPEA 
is extremely high, which suggests that the incentive (selection for the CPEA) is extremely 
effective in retaining colonels. On the other hand, some manpower planners also noticed 
that the attrition rates of colonels who were selected for the CPEA is high as well. These 
advisers suspect that the performance feedback provided by the institution may be 
generating perceptions about promotion probabilities and therefore playing a significant 
role in the retention of colonels. 
4. Performance Feedback and Appraisal System 
To understand how performance feedback may be generating perceptions on 
promotion probabilities able to influence attrition rates, one must understand the 
performance appraisal system in the Brazilian Air Force. 
According to the Officers’ Promotion Board, military careers in the Air Force is 
meritocratic, so the higher ranks and positions of greater relevance are expected to be 
filled by qualified officers and with most merit. Then, annually, all officers are evaluated 
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by their superiors through standardized performance appraisal forms and evaluations of 
fitness. 
To facilitate the job of the CPO in identifying the most deserving officers in 
comparison to their peers, the Board developed in 1990 its own methodology to quantify 
the merit of the officers. This methodology evaluates the results obtained from the 
official records of performance appraisals, fitness records, disciplinary sanctions, and 
results obtained in the career courses attributing points to each factor. Afterwards, these 
points are added by assigning specific weights to each factor. Once scored, officers 
belonging to the same cohort are ranked and for each cohort is generated a document 
called “Lista de Mérito Relativo” (LMR), List of Relative Merit, which according to the 
CPO is the basic tool for quantifying the merit of the officers.  
Another aspect is that the Promotions’ Board believes that the primary goal of 
performance appraisal is to provide constructive feedback to the officer about his job 
performance in order to provide for the military better working conditions by identifying 
their deficiencies and improve future performance. Within this philosophy, the system 
begun to divide the cohorts into three groups of equal size according to scores in the 
LMR, and providing for the members information about which group the military 
belongs. The Figure 1 shows an example of how the officer observes his own 
performance when accessing his account on the site of the promotion system. 
 
Figure 1.  Performance Feedback 
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This information turns to be available for the cohorts graduating after 1982 and 
showed in terms of “Group of Merit” the general performance (right picture), specific 
performance (upper-left picture), and career courses performance (bottom-left picture). 
For illustration, we can observe from Figure 1 how the system describes to the 
officers their performance. Let’s assume, for instance, that the feedback belongs to an 
officer whose cohort encompasses 90 members. Thus, in the factor leadership 
(liderança), first row in the upper-left picture, the score he achieved positioned him 
between the 31st and 60th position (what corresponds to Group 2 as checked in the box). 
Similarly, regarding the performance in career course (bottom-left picture), also 
positioned him in the same range. And finally, and most important in affecting 
perceptions, his overall ranking (right picture) placed him in a range that varies between 
the 61st and 90th position in the rank as compared with his peers (what corresponds to 
Group 3, as checked in the box, in the List of Relative Merit). 
The argument presented by manpower advisors is quite reasonable. Since each 
group of merit encompasses one-third of the cohort and considering that the percentage 
of people selected for the CPEA (around 80% per cohort per year) and the proportion of 
colonels being promoted to the rank of brigadier (between 10% and 15% per cohort) is 
easily traceable; it is reasonable to expect that only a portion of people classified in 
Group 3 will not be selected to the CPEA as well as only a fraction of people who belong 
to Group 1 will get promoted. In other words, it is fair to believe that the performance 
feedback probably could be inducing perceptions about promotion probabilities and 
therefore driven the retirement decision of some colonels. 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study retrieves and analyzes data from nine cohorts of the Brazilian Air 
Force (graduated between 1975 and 1983) belonging to the five Corps that have access to 
generalship. Descriptive statistics and econometric regressions are used to answer the 
research questions formulated in Section E of this chapter, that ultimately focuses on the 




As we have seen, every year the Promotions Board convenes to select to the 
CPEA the colonels who exhibited the best job performance throughout their career. Even 
though the Board has the incumbency to analyze performances, the choices are based on 
the numeric constraint dictated by the Personnel Headquarters. The main purpose of this 
study is identify to what extent the selection of a colonel to the CPEA contributes in the 
probabilities of retention in active duty in order to feed FAB authorities with a more 
accurate evidence to facilitate their role to establish policies regarding the CPEA’s 
selection process.  
As we have discussed, the FAB already noticed that the evasion of personnel that 
have not been selected to the CPEA is extremely high. The question is whether retention 
is a function of the CPEA’s selection processes or other correlated factor such as rank in 
the LMR, as claimed by some manpower planners. In this sense the other aspect that 
deserves attention is whether the proposition that the disclosure of information about 
relative merit is actually inducing perceptions and effectively driven retirement decisions, 
perhaps diminishing the impact of the incentive; therefore, this study also aims to 
investigate this issue. 
The analysis of the problem, controlling for both factors (selection for the CPEA 
and perceptions) can provide for the decision-makers a better understanding of the 
situation and consequently better conditions for establishing policies. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The Brazilian Air Force will be directly benefited by the results of the current 
study, once it provides more precise evidence about how the selection of a colonel for a 
career course as a nonmonetary incentive affects retention rates. Furthermore this study 
investigates what role perceptions (induced by disclosure of rank in the LMR) plays in 
this context.  
There is no doubt about FAB concerns regarding the retention of officers. 
However, the purpose of the CPEA is clearly stated by the Education Department as to 
provide specific knowledge, skills, and aptitudes to perform tasks as generals; manpower 
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planners do not ignore that CPEA’s selection affects retention rates. What is not so clear 
is how effective this incentive is and whether or not the perception induced by the LMR 
classification plays a role in this system. 
Although, the issue is intriguing and important in the perspective of HR 
managers, no study was found within the Air Force University that specifically addresses 
the influence of CPEA’s selection on colonels’ retention. Investigating these questions 
will certainly fill a blank and leave the FAB better guided to act toward its institutional 
goals. Moreover, since incentives and perceptions involving senior employees are 
realities present in both military and civilian sectors all around the world, the findings 
provided in this study can be generalized and add value for academic and business 
knowledge, as well.    
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To achieve its final goal this paper will pursue the following research questions: 
1. Primary Questions: 
• What is the effect of being selected for the CPEA on retention of colonels? 
• Is the effect of the CPEA different for colonels classified in different 
Groups of Merit? 
2. Secondary Question: 
• Does the effect of being selected for the CPEA differ across Corps?  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The current research is divided into five chapters. Chapter II presents the 
literature about organizational behavior and the existing academic knowledge, which 
addresses the problems discussed in this study: incentives, perceptions, and 
organizational culture. Chapters III and IV describe the data and methodology used to 
address the questions, as well as, the analysis of finding and results. Finally, Chapter V 
provides a brief synthesis of the study results and provides some suggestions about 
possible future studies and recommendations within the same theme. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main objective of this study is to analyze data from the Brazilian Air Force 
manpower databank and identify whether selection for the CPEA, as an incentive, 
influences retention rates of colonels belonging to the Corps and eligible for generalship. 
It is important to note that the CPEA was not intended to act as an incentive to motivate 
employees and reduce attrition rates. In fact, it is a course designed to improve human 
capital, delivering knowledge required to encourage the development of specific 
functions of the high-administration in the FAB. Indeed, promotions are broadly 
recognized as incentives, but the CPEA, as we have seen, is just a legal prerequisite for 
the promotion to the rank of brigadier. In other words, people that intend to be promoted 
have to take the CPEA, but whether the CPEA leads to the promotion deserves further 
discussion. Preliminary observation shows the results of the CPEA’s selection process 
exert a heavy impact on attrition rates. Therefore, it may be plausible to assume that, at 
least for those that strive for promotion, the CPEA could be considered an incentive.  
From a different perspective, as the internal regulation of Brazilian Air Force 
dictates, the selection for the CPEA is a merit-based process, and therefore the results of 
this selection in conjunction with some other meritocratic information, such as the 
performance feedback provided by the system, should be able to modify perceptions 
about career success. In such conditions, this information plays an instrumental role by 
pointing out whether a particular performance can lead to certain reward.  
This chapter reviews past studies in the literature that address the characteristics 
of incentives in relation to organizational outcomes. I also review Vroom’s Expectancy 
Theory and some past studies related to it, in order to understand the role of 
instrumentality in this context. 
A. INCENTIVES 
As we have seen, the existing human resources within an organization are one of 
the most important assets that the institution needs to manage. Mathis et al. (2014) 
suggested that the successful management of human resources is strategic for the 
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organization. To survive in a competitive environment they should be able to respond 
quickly to the challenges or scenario changes, and many times the key for this quick 
response resides in the existing human capital the institution possess. Moreover, the 
strategic management of human resources is challenging by nature; since the human 
being, differently than other assets the organization should manage, has its own wishes. 
Thus, the organizations cannot stock their employees in shelves and believe they will be 
available at the moment they need. It is possible that employees get demotivated and 
switch to another company being unavailable in the critical moments.  
As a result, in both public and private institutions, incentive packages have been 
designed to achieve or enhance the organizational goals. Different types of incentives 
have been used and have played an important role in enhancing performance and 
reducing attrition rates (Stitt, 2009). In organizations, these rewards normally come in the 
form of monetary incentives, such as pay, raises, health insurance, profit-sharing, and 
nonmonetary incentives like employment security, learning opportunities, praise, 
recognition, and status (Morrell, 2011). 
1. Monetary Incentives 
a. Monetary Incentives Are Effective 
Even though it sounds very intuitive that incentives lead to positive organizational 
outcomes, it is not as simple as one may assume. Providing more money to a worker does 
not necessarily lead to the desired outcome. Many empirical research studies have 
supported the effectiveness of monetary incentives, but a series of implications have been 
found as well. In fact, Chng, Rodgers, Shih, and Song (2012) stated that many 
researchers agree that incentive compensations are able to influence managerial behaviors 
and organizational outcomes, but the responses to the incentives are quite complex. 
Depending on the type of the incentive offered, sometimes the induced behavior takes a 
direction different than expected.  
The study of Chng et al. (2012) used a simulation in part-time MBA students in a 
university in China and found that the behavior of employees in relation to compensation 
depends upon personal characteristics and situational factors. That means, the response to 
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a given incentive could vary from a person to another due the fact they have different 
characteristics or even vary from people with similar characteristics if they were in firms 
under different contingencies (growing or declining). 
A study conducted by Lakhani (1988) investigated the effects of Regular Military 
Pay and Selective Reenlistment Bonus on quit rates of U.S. Army soldiers eligible for 
reenlistment, using data from the Defense Manpower Data Center. The empirical results 
of his research showed that both (basic pay and reenlistment bonus) had a negative 
correlation with quit rates; however, the Regular Military Compensation showed a higher 
elasticity than the enlistment bonus. The author noted that use of these bonuses has some 
advantages: it is easier to change periodically and across different occupations. 
Moreover, he also found that soldiers belonging to combat occupations were more 
responsive to the monetary incentive than those belonging to noncombat occupations. He 
suggests that this fact was justifiable since the human capital of soldiers with experience 
in noncombat occupations was more likely to be transferable to the civilian labor market. 
We can assume than that opportunity cost is an important factor to be considered in 
someone’s decision regarding job opportunities. 
Motivated by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) budget constraints, Watson 
(2012) used data on the Navy’s aviation community to assess how the retention of 
qualified officers belonging to that community would be affected if the Aviation Career 
Continuation Pay (ACCP) were altered or discontinued. The author adapted a logistic 
multiple regression model to predict the levels of retention for different levels of pay and 
found that the continuation of ACCP is essential to maintaining aviation officers. The 
predictions the model achieved under different results scenarios visually suggest that the 
response to the incentive is not linear. As the value of pay increases, the attractiveness 
increases as well, but at lower rates.  
A study conducted by Ortiz (2014) used surveys to evaluate the preference of 
enlisted recruiters in the Navy for monetary and nonmonetary incentives. The results 
showed that these recruits were not very motivated by NMIs but the response for 
monetary incentive was very effective. Overall the results of the study suggest that even 
though some drawbacks would be expected, such as loss of cohesion and possible frauds, 
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the use of a small bonus per number of contracts per month rather than a fixed bonus 
would significantly improve the productivity of the recruiters. These results suggest this 
specific group is very sensitive to monetary rewards. They would improve effort to 
achieve targets if the reward were anchored in targets or would improve effort to achieve 
higher productivity if the reward system would be based in productivity. Cook (1988) 
also studied the behavior of enlisted Navy personnel responding to monetary incentives. 
In this case he investigated how nuclear-trained enlisted responded to pay raises in terms 
of retention. Similarly to Ortiz (2014), he found a positive correlation between the 
incentive and the outcome. However, in a contrary way, he observed a small elasticity. 
Previous research using different categories of people had discovered higher elasticities. 
In fact, Cook (1988) found the pay elasticity of nuclear occupations was 0.35, whereas 
the previous studies using other works found an elasticity around 2 to 3. This means that 
1% increase in salary would be able to promote a 0.35% increase in retention of nuclear 
trained enlisted personnel or a 2% to 3% increase in retention in other occupations. Cook 
(1988) investigated the civilian market for similar occupations and found the civilian 
nuclear industry used to pay near the double in terms of salaries. According to the author, 
the big ratio between civilian/military pay and also the poor environmental conditions 
(these type of professionals are required to spend a considerable portion of their time on 
sea duty) help to explain the low elasticity. 
b. Use of Monetary Incentives Has Limitations 
Sorauren (2000) agreed with the economic proposition that the monetary 
incentives are able to motivate people to work. However, he also affirmed that the 
monetary incentive could not be the perfect motivator, due to the inherent conflict of 
interest generated between employers and employees as consequence of the fact that the 
material goods cannot be perfectly shared. When the object to be shared is knowledge, 
for example, employers can deliver it to their employees without losing anything; but 
when the object turns to money, it is impossible to increase the salaries of employees 
without losing profitability. Other authors display different points of view. For Kohn 
(1995), the rewards are not able to motivate people to work; instead they are only able to 
motivate people to work to get the reward, in other words, the reward can just foster a 
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temporary submission. Furthermore, Kohn (1995) stated that the reward undermines the 
intrinsic motivation, since it makes one believe if it is necessary to be “bribed” to work 
then the work should not be such a pleasant activity.  
Bailey and Fessler (2011) studied the effects of monetary incentives regarding the 
variation of tasks in terms of attractiveness and complexity. In their experiment they 
decomposed the task in two different pieces: (1) initial performance and (2) rate of 
improvement. The authors figured that as the complexity of tasks increases, knowledge 
and skills should increase as well to foster a change in performance. Indeed, in order to 
get the reward one could improve effort levels, but it would be impossible for anyone to 
improve (at least in the short run) his or her levels of skills and knowledge. In this sense, 
according to Bonner et al. (as cited in Bailey and Fessler, 2011), increase in complexity is 
less sensitive to monetary rewards The other point Bailey and Fessler (2011) defended 
was that as the task increase in attractiveness, it is more likely to induce intrinsic 
motivation and therefore the effectiveness of monetary incentives would tend to diminish 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). The authors found, as they predicted, that monetary incentives are 
more effective when tasks are simultaneously less complex and unattractive. Moreover, 
the monetary incentive is ineffective to produce “learn” (increase in rate of 
improvement). 
2. Nonmonetary Incentives (NMIs) 
a. Incentives Are Complex 
The use of nonmonetary incentives has been extensively studied as well. In 
periods of budget constraints, they could be a possible alternative to handle the 
challenges of managing the talents with scarce resources. Coughlan, Gates, and Myung 
(2013), studying more specifically the nonmonetary incentives, affirmed that the use of 
NMIs could be cost effective when the value the people attribute to them are lower than 
the cost for the employer. They stated that the monetary compensation will begin to 
diminish at some point and after this point the effect of nonmonetary incentives is 
supposed to gain relatively more importance. In fact, the law of diminishing returns, as 
applied to pay, suggests, “while more pay will be more attractive, the rate of increase in 
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attractiveness will be less than the rate of increase in pay” (Worley, Bowen, & Lawler, 
1992, p. 561).  
To verify the diminishing returns principle, Worley et al. (1992) conducted 
empirical research among sales personnel geographically dispersed and belonging to an 
appliance manufacturer company in United States and supported the hypothesis that the 
relationship between the size of pay and attractiveness of pay was curvilinear with a 
significant and negative quadratic term. 
Based on the literature review above, many empirical studies support the 
effectiveness of monetary incentives to foster desirable organizational outcomes, but 
many other factors make them quite complex. Similarly the NMIs have also been vastly 
studied and proven to motivate people toward desirable outcomes. Coughlan et al. (2013) 
tried to build a package of nonmonetary incentives that could be cost effective in 
addressing the needs of the DOD to reduce expenses while maintaining the ability to 
retain the high-level militaries to convey the missions the U.S. government is committed 
to. The authors concluded that overall the members valued some types of NMIs and 
stated that the use of these incentives (when the member valued it more than it cost to the 
government) is cost effective. However, they also found that to choose a package of 
incentives that could satisfy the majority of the personnel would be overwhelmingly 
complex. They found the existence of at least three sources of variability regarding 
preferences of members in the administration of NMIs: (1) variability across population 
classes or communities; (2) variability across individuals; and (3) variability across 
different NMIs packages. That means: (1) people with similar characteristics value a 
determined incentive more than other people with different characteristics. For example, 
if one divided a determined population in two different classes: unmarried and married, it 
is possible that the married people would value certain incentives, such as daycare more 
than the singles would because the married group is more likely to have children and 
need the service; (2) individuals within the same group could also present a particular 
preference for some incentives different than others. Using the same example from 
above, since there are spouses that are employed in the labor market while others are 
homemakers, the value of daycare would be different for the two different married 
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employees (even if both are parents). Finally, (3) trying to combine two or more 
incentives makes the issue even more problematic because the effect of combining more 
than one incentive is not simply additive, since some people consider the incentives 
complementary, while others consider the incentives substitutes and some might perceive 
them as totally independent. 
b. Individuals Respond Differently to Incentives 
Corroborating with the assertion of Coughlan et al. (2013) about individuals 
differences in responsiveness to incentives, Pema, Mehay, and Tick (n.d.) examined the 
role of personality traits in job decisions for the U.S. Navy. The authors used the Tailored 
Adaptive Personality Test (TAPAS), which is a test developed by the Army to assess the 
big five personality traits. Using datasets from the Navy Recruiting Command and 
Defense Manpower Data Center, they evaluated whether personality can affect enlistment 
decisions in American youth and found that some personality traits were predictive of 
enlistment decisions and therefore should be used in the screening and recruiting 
processes. In an earlier study, DeMatteo and Eby (1997) also studied individual 
differences and responses to incentives. They examined, in a field study, the relationship 
between some individual characteristics like orientation to work in teams and self-
perception of ability in the acceptance to team-rewards and found that these 
characteristics influence the valorization each individual gives to this type of incentive 
(in terms of satisfaction and turnover intentions). 
c. Senior Employees Respond Better to NMIs 
Also aligned with the proposition of Coughlan et al. (2013) about variability of 
incentives across populations classes, Pink (2009) affirmed that a research conducted at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology showed that the monetary incentives are 
effective in increasing performance of employees in mechanical tasks. However, when it 
turns to tasks that require more complex skills, such as creativity, innovation or higher 
level of cognitive domain, the nonmonetary incentives, after satisfying the basic needs, 
are more effective. It is true that complex skills are not necessarily related to seniority, 
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but considering managerial positions or Armed Forces senior officers, we can fairly 
assume that the NMIs are likely to be more effective. 
A research conducted by Takahashi (2006) leads to some similar conclusions with 
slight differences. For him, the observations of basic needs are important and also the 
effect of NMIs appears to be more effective in senior employees than junior ones. It is 
important to highlight that the Japanese culture is very oriented toward seniority. That 
means, rarely does a junior employee take over a senior one, independent of the skills he 
possesses. Moreover, the companies’ structures used to be very flat, and managerial 
positions are few. So, to maintain a high level of motivation, organizations raise wages 
based on development of skills. This means that wages are not strictly related to ranks or 
positions. These cultural practices help to explain why senior employees are more 
sensitive to promotion than junior ones and why junior employees respond better to 
salaries. However, the author found that overall both, monetary and nonmonetary 
incentives are meaningful for both classes. 
Takahashi (2006) assessed the effects of monetary and nonmonetary incentives in 
employees belonging to a group of companies from the automotive sector in the Japanese 
market. He distributed surveys for white-collar and blue-collar workers of units from 
Toyota Motors in Japan. The survey aimed to investigate and understand the effects of 
two different incentives (promotion and wage) in the motivation of workers and 
concluded that both incentives exerted a strong influence on the employees’ motivation to 
work hard. The study showed that in both groups, white-collar and blue-collar workers, 
the fair promotion presented a higher effect in motivating people to work hard than wages 
did, but the white-collar ones strongly valued the development opportunities. The study 
also discovered that the salary level and the experience of receiving an increase in salary 
also had an important effect in enhancing employees’ motivation, particularly for the 
younger employees that valued the wages more than the promotion. 
d. Different Cultures Respond Differently to Incentives 
One other important point to address is, independent of the incentive being 
monetary or nonmonetary, the cultural background may change the response to the 
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incentive. The study of Gretzinger, Matiaske, Lemke, and Piske (2014) analyzed a 
multinational company with 14,000 employees spread over 32 different countries and 
aimed to verify whether cultural differences affected the incentive reward system 
response in relation to turnover rates. The findings showed yes. Overall, a merit-based 
award system proved more efficient in individualistic cultures than collectivistic ones, 
and monetary-based incentives around social security proved better for cultures that are 
more risk averse. In this way, the authors concluded that if the goals are to enhance 
commitment levels or reduce turnover rates the company should be able to adapt the 
human resources management practices to the background culture. The key is that 
understanding the employee’s needs is critical to conquering his or her commitment and 
loyalty. 
e. Basic Needs Should Be Addressed First 
The earliest motivational theories were born in the 1950s (Robbins & Judge, 
2012), and undoubtedly Maslow and his Need Hierarchy Theory were the simple and 
widely discussed theory in the field of motivation (Aswathappa & Reddy, 2009). In 
Maslow’s concept the factors that produce motivation could be classified in five different 
levels (Self-Actualization, Esteem, Social, Safety, and Physiological) and arranged in a 
hierarchical pyramid, so that the needs of lower order (physiological) should be met first, 
that is, the person’s concerns about some needs advance to the next level only after 
satisfied (or at least minimally satisfied) the needs of prior level. Also, according to 
Aswathappa & Reddy (2009), salary and basic work conditions, in the organizational 
context, are classified as physiological needs. After Maslow, the Two-Factor Theory of 
Work Motivation published by Herzberg in 1959 enhanced this concept. This theory, also 
known as Theory of Hygiene Factors, stated that only some factors were able to provoke 
motivation, whereas other factors could only avoid dissatisfaction; in this way, they 
should be measured under two different continuums (Stello, 2011). Although very 
important, for having been the theoretical foundations from where many other theories 
have grown, these early theories have been the target of criticism and questioned in terms 
of validity (Robbins & Judge, 2012). Nonetheless, many studies on the effect of NMIs 
have shown, as the early theories stated, that basic needs should be observed. Appelbaum 
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& Kamal (2000), for instance, investigated the effectiveness of the nonfinancial 
incentives in small business (firms with less than 100 employees) in Canada. They 
distributed surveys to employees of 45 firms and concluded that many different 
nonmonetary incentives were effective in increasing firms’ attractiveness like 
recognition, job enrichment, internal pay equity and managerial skill. They also found 
that the use of these incentives should not be random but based on specific needs of the 
employees for each specific firm and that the combination of NMIs had a synergistic 
effect. Furthermore, aligned with the motivational theories, the study clearly found that 
income is essential in the package of incentives to provide, at least the basic 
physiological and security needs in a way to optimize the employee efficiency, regarding 
the improvement of productivity, reduction of absenteeism and turnover rates. 
Actually the results of the study of Appelbaum and Kamal (2000) were initially 
contradictory. The authors mixed quantitative and qualitative approaches in their 
research, and while data showed that employees valued NMIs, they were clear in 
affirming “nothing other pay would serve to dissuade a move.” (p. 753). Further 
investigation led Appelbaum and Kamal (2000) to the fact that household income was a 
moderating variable in determining the effectiveness of job recognition. The authors 
stated, therefore, that it was easily understandable that people facing financial troubles 
might have difficulties valuing the nonmonetary incentives. 
Pinto (2011) also studied the effects of nonmonetary incentives in an industrial 
company in Portugal and used a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(document collection, surveys, interviews, and focus groups). He found that the 
Department of Human Resources in that company understood that the NMIs should be 
part of compensation package but it could not be a substitute of monetary ones, since it 
would generate dissatisfaction. For the HR department, the NMIs should be 
complementary and integrated to a system of rewards. In the same line, Pinto (2011) 
figured out that the employees valued the NMIs, but they were afraid that this 
compensation could be a substitute for the cash incentives. The work overall concluded 
that NMIs are important and valued by employees and recognized as so by the company, 
but the primary necessities could not be neglected. The author also stated that his work 
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found support in Herzberg’s Two Factors Theory and affirmed that employees adhered to 
the statement that factors that cause motivation are different from factors that cause 
satisfaction. As the Two-Factors Theory suggests, salary is a hygienic factor: although it 
cannot produce satisfaction, it is necessary to avoid dissatisfaction. 
B. EXPECTANCY THEORY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the attendance to the CPEA is clearly stated 
in the current FAB’s legislation as a prerequisite for promotion. Not being selected for 
the course, therefore, extinguishes any chance of promotion. However, the selection for 
the course, even though necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee promotion, since the 
number of vacancies in the functions of generalship to be fulfilled each year is always 
smaller than the number of colonels graduated in the ECEMAR. 
Having reviewed the varying influence of incentives on motivation, this section 
utilizes Expectancy Theory to develop hypotheses that help explain variance in the effect 
of the CPEA as a retention tool for the Brazilian Air Force. Moreover it is important to 
address the concerns about the role played by the performance feedback that all Air Force 
officers receive from the system in terms of classification in the List of Relative Merit. 
As seen in Chapter I, all officers are divided in three tiers that FAB calls Group of Merit, 
and they are informed about the group they belong to. For this sake, manpower planners 
in the Air Force believe this information affects perceptions about chances of promotion 
and therefore plays a significant role in retention of colonels. 
Ultimately, this study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating how a 
specific population (Brazilian Air Force colonels) responds to a determined nonmonetary 
incentive and how the flow of information related to performance is able to modify 
perceptions and influence the strength of the NMI in fostering desirable organizational 
outcomes. 
The Expectancy Theory developed by Victor Vroom is currently one of the most 
widely recognized motivational theories (Robbins & Judge, 2012). The theory basically 
aims to understand whether employees are motivated to put an extra level of effort to 
achieve a determined reward. 
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Figure 2 shows that an increase in individual effort leads to an increase in 
performance, and by the turn, this increase in performance level may lead to a determined 
reward that may or may not be aligned with personal goals.    
 
Figure 2.  Expectancy Theory. Source: Slideshare at 
http://www.slideshare.net/leng81287/robbins-eob9-instppt05. 
 
In this reasoning, there are three important relationships in this system: (1) Effort–
Performance (expectancy); (2) Performance–Reward (instrumentality); and (3) Reward–
Personal Goals (valence). 
The three links could be defines as: 
• “Expectancy is the perceived probability that effort will lead to good 
performance” (Abadi et al., 2011). 
• “Instrumentality is the perceived probability that good performance will 
lead to desired outcomes” (Abadi et al., 2011). 
• “Valence refers the value the individual personally places on rewards” 
(Abadi et al., 2011). 
Vroom’s theory states that the strength that moves someone to a determined 
choice depends on a product of three factors, which refers to the three relationships afore 
mentioned. 
 F = E x I x V (1) 
In Equation 1, F is the motivational force that pushes someone to move toward a 
determined direction. E is the expectancy or the perception that an extra effort will lead 
to an increase in performance. I is the instrumentality or the belief that determined level 
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of performance can lead to the reward. V is the valence or the importance that the 
individual in scope gives to that reward. 
To support expectancy theory, various empirical research have been conducted. 
According to Salanova et al. (1996) (as cited in Regis & Calado, 2001) the Vroom model 
aims to predict individual decisions. In this sense, some studies built models to predict, 
based on the expectancy theory, the behavior of some employees.  
De Oliveira, Madruga, and Pontes (2013), for instance, developed a model to 
predict the willingness of employees belonging to Banco do Brasil to participate in a 
corporate volunteering program based on expectancy theory. His methodology basically 
replied, with the necessary adjustments to fit in the context of that culture, the previous 
studies of Parker and Dyer (1975) and Allen, Lucero, and Van Norman (1997). They 
distributed surveys and focused on the variables related to valence, instrumentality, and 
expectancy to predict, based on a formula similar to that showed in Equation 1, how 
inclined each particular employee was to participate in a determined program. Attributing 
points to the answers, they scored each of the three variables (valence, instrumentality, 
expectancy) and determined the motivational force to participate, and motivational force 
to not participate in the program. Those whose scores to “participate” were higher than 
“not participate” were supposed to be volunteers in the program, since, according to 
Abadi, Jalilvand, Sharif, Salimi, and Khanzadeh (2011), individuals are expected to 
choose between the options (participate or not participate) the one that provides the 
greatest motivational force. And finally crossing the information of those who declared 
willingness to participate with the results of motivational forces, one can figure the 
reliability of the model.  
Summarizing the purpose of this study is to investigate the ability the selection for 
the CPEA has in promoting retention. As we viewed, NMIs are expected to foster 
positive organizational outcomes, especially for senior employees; but also, due to the 
complexity of incentives, variations are expected across different groups of people and 
across different individuals. The expectancy theory explains these variations. Assuming 
that different individuals have different valence (desire to achieve the promotion to 
generalship) and different groups of people (in terms of Group of Merit) can nurture 
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different perceptions about instrumentality (chances to get promoted after being selected 
for the CPEA) it is possible to make some important inferences. 
1. CPEA and Instrumentality 
My first point refers to instrumentality. According Robbins and Judge (2012), 
instrumentality is “the degree the individual believes performing at a particular level will 
lead to the attainment of a desired outcome” (p. 86). As we have mentioned, the selection 
for a career course is defined in internal Air Force regulation as a function of merit (good 
performance). Moreover, it is clear in the law that the CPEA is a prerequisite for 
promotion. So, there is no doubt for those that belong to that system that lose the chance 
to attend the course will vanish any possibility of promotion. Thus, it is a break in 
instrumentality, what this means is that the performance presented by that specific 
colonel was not enough to lead him for the promotion in scope.  
Further, I am assuming that a selection for the CPEA is an incentive, regarding 
the obvious fact that it keeps the military in the “run” for promotion and also is a 
recognition of good services and a career development opportunity as well. Since 
incentives are supposed to lead to positive outcomes, recalling the statements of Pink 
(2009) and findings of Takahashi (2006) that lead us to believe that senior employees are 
likely to have a good response to NMIs, I suggest that: 
 
H1) the selection for the CPEA will increase retention rates. 
 
2. Performance Feedback and Expectancy 
The second point I want to address is about expectancy. According to Robbins 
and Judge (2012) expectancy is “the probability perceived by the individual that exerting 
a given amount of effort will lead to performance” (p. 86). As we stated, FAB started to 
deliver for the officers graduated after 1982 the information about the Group of Merit 
they belong and according to some manpower planners, this information possibly is 
interfering in the decision of colonels to anticipate their retirement. As a matter of fact, 
this information reflects somehow (quantitatively) the official records about around 30 
 24 
years of past performance. In this situation, if the colonel believes it would be extremely 
difficult to increase the effort to a certain level that could change an unfavorable position 
in terms of performance in the remaining four or five years, then there is a break in 
expectancy that theoretically justifies a premature request of retirement. 
 
H2) colonels belonging to Group 1 will respond better to the incentive 
(selection for the CPEA) compared to Groups 2 and 3. 
 
3. Promotion and Valence 
One last point in the expectancy theory that should be commented concerns the 
valence (whether the offered incentive matches with the personal goals). Our reasoning, 
up to this point, was based on the assumption that the colonel aims for the promotion, 
what might not be true in some cases. As Coughlan et al. (2013) suggested, the value a 
determined person gives to a determined incentive will depend on the person and also on 
the incentive. Chances are that some people really enjoy the activity or at least the status 
that comes with the rank of colonel or the functions linked to that rank. If that is true, the 
promotion probably would be an extra incentive since the functions and prestige 
associated to the rank of general would be even higher. But, since these people grew in 
their career knowing that the chances to ascend beyond the rank of O-6 is low, it is 
possible that some colonels will not get frustrated by not being promoted or receiving 
some information that leads him to the belief that promotion is unlikely. A study in South 
Africa conducted by Visagie and Koekemoer (2014) argues that formerly career success 
was defined as pay raises and vertical ascensions, mainly for employees in management 
positions such as senior managers. But what the authors found in their study was that pay 
and promotions are not all that managers strive in their careers. There are some different 
objectives to be pursued that vary from people to people and change in the same people 
as they grow in maturity. In fact, there are a number of objectives people aim to achieve 
to feel fulfilled and contented with the job, like personal growth, development of 
functions in leadership, exceeding personal and organizational goals, adding value for 
organization, receiving feedback and recognition, just to name a few. In the same 
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reasoning, it is fair to believe that some officers do not care that much about the 
promotion (prioritizing life balance or other opportunities outside the military) and even 
being selected for the CPEA will ask retirement prior to completing the five years in 
rank. 
These statements are very aligned to the findings of some authors that affirmed 
incentives are complex and vary from one person to another. Though, it does make sense 
to assume that different people have different goals and therefore the value of a given 
incentive surely would depend on whether the incentive matches the goal.  
 
H3) of those in the highest group of merit, there will still be variance 
in the retention rates due to different values. 
 
Beyond the field of expectancy theory, there is one last point mentioned in this 
study that should be addressed since it is relevant for decision-makers when analyzing 
alternatives to establish policies regarding the CPEA. Officers belonging to different 
Corps are under the same legislation, but the policies that govern career flow can be 
different to support the different needs of the institution. The issue concerns the possible 
difference that the Corps could present in relation to the incentive. Three different 
perspectives converging to the same conclusion have been mentioned in this paper. 
Coughlan et al. (2013) supported that it is expected variability across different population 
classes; Gretzinger et al. (2014) remembered that when the objective is to improve 
employees’ motivation the background culture should be observed; and Lakhani (1988) 
found that opportunity cost plays an important role in job decisions. As we have told, 
officers belonging for five different specializations are eligible for promotions to the 
ranks of generalship and therefore are in the scope of this research. Although they are 
very similar to some sense (all are colonels of the Brazilian Air Force), since they belong 
to different Corps they could be considered belonging to different subcultures. In fact 
those colonels were graduated from different schools, normally spent their careers in 
different organizations and report to different headquarters. Furthermore, although all of 
them exist to support the same institution, their specific goals are very different. They 
dress in different uniforms for their daily routine due to the specificity of each function, 
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cluster in groups with similar background and use a “language” (colloquial and technical) 
that, for those who do not belong to the group, requires “translation” to fully understand 
the content. And finally, regarding the opportunity cost, the demand for their human 
capital in the civilian labor market is remarkably different. For instance, the Brazilian 
government is currently creating agreements to facilitate the entry of physicians from 
other countries into the Brazilian public health system, whereas the hiring of foreign 
pilots is still forbidden for national aviation companies. Moreover the chances of career 
success, regarding the probabilities to get promoted or assume relevant functions inside 
the Brazilian Force are also fairly different. 
A brief glance at Decree 8209, which currently dictates the billets for the 
Brazilian Air Force, for the fiscal year 2014 gives a clear notion about this issue. The 
document authorizes the FAB to be manned with 2,500 aviators and 2,868 officers 
belonging the other four Corps altogether. However, due to the specificities of the 
functions related to the higher administration, the aviators are privileged when 
considering the chances to ascend in the career. While 64 functions for generals are 
reserved for aviators, only 17 are reserved for the other four specialties altogether. Table 
2 shows more precisely the total number of officers and generals per specialization 
authorized for the fiscal year 2014. Moreover, the promotion for highest rank in the 
career, that leads to the functions in the Air Force High Command are exclusively 








Table 2.   Distribution of officers in Brazilian Air Force for FY 20143 








 O-9 O-8 O-7  
QOAV (AVIATOR) 8 21 35 64 2,500 
QOENG (ENGINEER) - 1 5 6 557 
QOINT (STEWARDSHIP) - 2 6 8 954 
QOMED (PHYSICIAN) - 1 5 6 957 
QODENT - - - - 357 
QOFARM - - - - 165 
QOINF (INFANTRY) - - 1 1 399 
QOEsp  - - - - 967 
QOEA - - - - 1,455 
SUBTOTAL 8 25 52 85 8,311 
 
Once the colonels belonging to the five different Corps are supposed to belong to 
different subcultures and have different opportunity costs, regarding the chances they 
have inside the Air Force and in the civilian labor market, it is fair to believe that 
individuals belonging to different Corps will respond differently to the same incentive. 
Therefore, I adhere to the findings of Coughlan et al. (2013), Lakhani (1988), and 
Gretzinger et al. (2014) and, based on the proportions showed in Table 1, hypothesize 
that: 
H4) Aviators will present a better response to the CPEA’s selection in 
terms of retention. 
 
  
3 Data extracted from the Decree 8209/2014 available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_Ato2011-2014/2014/Decreto/D8209.htm.  
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MODELS SPECIFICATION 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study retrieves data from the Brazilian Air Force manpower databanks to 
analyze how colonels behave in terms of retention in response to selection for the CPEA.  
The data came from two sources:  
1. Sistema de Gerenciamento de Pessoal (SIGPES). The Personnel 
Management System is managed by the Personnel Headquarters and 
provided data with demographic information such as rank, specialty, date 
of birth, marital status, number of dependents, race, religion, and date of 
inactivity. 
2. Sistema de Promoções (SISPROM). The Officers Promotion Board 
manages the Promotions’ System. The data provided meritocratic 
information such as the punctuation in List of Relative Merit, the tier 
(Group of Merit) in which each officer was classified, dates of 
promotions, and whether or not each officer had been selected to be 
enrolled in the CPEA. 
The original data includes nine different cohorts of officers educated in one of the 
Brazilian Air Force training schools (graduated between the years 1975 and 1983) who 
belong to the five Corps with access to positions of general officers (aviators, 
stewardships, infantry, engineers, and physicians). After merged, the remaining file 
generated records pertaining to 1,927 people (equivalent to entire population of the 
mentioned cohorts).  
From that 1,927 people whose data referred, 1,036 reached the rank of colonel. 
After deleting data with missing or inconsistent information, records relating to 1,021 
colonels were used in the logit regressions. 
Figure 3 depicts the size of cohorts and proportions that the Brazilian Air Force 
has applied regarding the CPEA’s selection process. The selection is conducted in the 
Promotion Board, but the process observes the guidance of the Air Force Chief of Staff 
Office that annually coordinates the vacancies for the course regarding the constraints of 




Figure 3.  Selection for the CPEA across Cohorts 
Figure 4 shows how the colonels are divided in terms of specializations, which 
ultimately reflects the proportion of colonels existing in the Air Force distributed across 
these five different Corps.  
  
Figure 4.  Proportion of Corps 
Although the number of people is vastly different as showed in Figure 4, the 
selection process logically takes the size of the Corps into consideration, since the 















fulfilled by a determined specialization. Figure 5 shows the proportions of colonels 
selected for the course across the different Corps.  
 
Figure 5.  Selection for the CPEA across Corps 
As it is salient, the infantry has an index of CPEA selection that is much smaller 
than the other Corps. Actually, the first function for brigadier infantry was created in 
2008, explaining the lower selection rate for that specific Corps (infantry) and reflecting 
the transitory period of policies adjustment. 
1. Dependent Variable 
a. Retention 
The dependent variable considered in the analysis is ret3. Retention is a 
dichotomous variable representing the decision of an officer to stay or to leave the active 
duty in a determined period of time. The variable ret3 assumes the value “1” whenever 
the officer remained on active duty for a period exceeding three years after his promotion 
to the rank of colonel, and “0” otherwise.  
The three-year period was chosen for several reasons. According to the legislation 
that governs career flow in the FAB, the maximum period foreseeable for an officer to 















important for the sake of policies’ establishment. Normally the Board appreciates each 
cohort for the CPEA in the first year in the rank of O-6 in a way that the selected officers 
turn available for the course from the beginning of the subsequent academic year. 
Considering the course lasts for one year, any analysis for periods shorter than two years 
would be unfruitful. Usually colonels are judged and promoted in the fifth year; but in 
some cases, to cope with administrative needs, this process must be anticipated. The 
Brazilian Constitution dictates that it is for the President of the Republic the choice of 
colonels who will be promoted to the circle of general officers. Before the FAB submits 
the list of possible promotees, the colonels go through two screenings in the Air Force, 
the first in the Promotion Board and the second in the High Command. To foster a 
regular and balanced career flow, the administration tends to push one Cohort per year in 
the promotion process that normally occurs when the colonels complete the fifth year in 
the rank. In these situations, when the promotion processes begin in the Board, the results 
of the screenings leave, for some colonels, evidence that their promotion is unlikely and 
after some point impossible. Therefore, the attrition after four years in the rank is natural, 
even before completion the promotion process what makes the retirement mandatory. 
However, sometimes it is necessary to anticipate the processes of some cohorts to handle 
with internal needs. When it is the case, the attrition naturally begins in the third year. 
Therefore, to avoid the contamination of the results, this study considers retention as 
successful whenever the colonel remains in the rank for periods longer than three years, 
considering that some cohorts should be promoted to O-7 in the fourth year of O-6 and 
the promotion process begins within a few months of anticipation. 
2. Explanatory Variables 
a. CPEA 
The variable of interest in this study is cpea. This variable is also dichotomous 
and assumes the value of “1” whenever the colonel is selected for the course and “0” in 
the contrary situation. The main objective of this study is to determine what influence the 
selection of a colonel for the CPEA carries in the retention’s probabilities of this officer. 
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b. List of Relative Merit 
The Lista de Mérito Relativo (LMR) is a list of officers belonging to the same 
cohort, sorted in a decreasing order of merit, whose calculations were made according to 
an internal methodology developed in the CPO. The LMR is the basic tool to quantify 
individual merit and the distinction of an officer compared to his peers, according to the 
Officers Assessment Manual edited by the CPO. 
To sort officers in terms of merit, the Brazilian Air Force developed a 
methodology that attributes points to the results of performance appraisals, academic 
courses, physical evaluations, and disciplinary sanctions. Annually, the Promotion Board 
attributes points for the four factors above mentioned and applies a weighted average to 
each officer who ends up with a punctuation that could range from 0 to 1,500. After 
having been punctuated, the officers of the same cohort are sorted in a unique list (LMR) 
according to their relative merit. The punctuation in the LMR will be used in the 
regression models in the current study as a proxy of merit. So, the next explanatory 
variable to be controlled is lmr_points. 
c. Performance Feedback 
All the colonels in the considered population received punctuation and were 
ranked in the LMR. However, only commanders or generals that need such information 
for decision-making processes access this list. Typically, this information is used by the 
Promotion Board itself to deal with decisions that refer to the selections for career 
courses or promotions.  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, one of the objectives of performance appraisal 
is to provide constructive feedback to their officers in order to enable them, knowing 
their deficiencies, to work them out, in order to improve future performance. With this 
objective, the FAB began to inform the officers graduating from the cohort of 1982, 
about the group of merit that each officer was classified. Therefore, there are people in 
the dataset that received punctuation and were classified in the LMR, but never were 
informed about group of merit. These people will be used as a control group in this 
investigation. 
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In order to address the concerns of manpower adviser and investigate whether the 
induced perceptions fostered by the performance feedback were able to drain the power 
of the CPEA as an incentive for retention, the sample was dived in three groups to create 
interaction terms as showed bellow: 
• Group 1—colonels classified in Group of Merit 1 
• Group 2—colonels classified in Groups of Merit 2 or 3 
The interaction terms were generated from the multiplication of cpea and groups 
mentioned above generating the follow interactions: 
• cpea_group1—variable that represents people that were selected to do the 
CPEA and were classified in Group 1. 
• cpea2_group2—variable that represents people that were selected to do 
the CPEA and were classified either in Groups 2 or 3. 
The logit regression will interact the variables cpea and group1 to check whether 
the interaction is significant and how much each explanatory variable impacts the 
dependent variable. 
d. Specialties 
The last research question refers to Corps. As mentioned in Chapters I and II, the 
FAB has different necessities regarding the specialization of its general officers and, for 
this sake, knowing how different each Corps behaves helps to frame specific policies for 
each specialization. 
Very similar to the interactions created in the prior section, interactions between 
selection for the CPEA and Corps were created, and the following interaction terms were 
generated: 
• cpea_aviator—variable that represents people selected to do the CPEA 
and belonging to the Corps of aviators. 
• cpea_other_corps—variable that represents people selected to do the 
CPEA and belonging to the Corps other than aviator. 
The logit regression will interact the variables cpea and aviator to check whether 
the interaction is significant and how much this relationship impacts the dependent 
variable. 
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e. Demographic Variables 
Similar to this study, much research has been conducted to investigate questions 
related to attrition, retention, reenlistment, and so on. Basically, these studies applied to 
military environments try to predict the impact of a determined variable of interest in a 
personal decision to stay or leave the active duty. Usually studies control for 
demographic variables in their models. The legislation that governs career flow in the 
Brazilian Air Force is clear in stating that the internal processes to choose officers to 
career courses are eminently meritocratic, in such a way that demographic variables 
could be excluded from the model. However, if some kind of prejudice did exist in the 
processes then, failing to control for those demographic variable would be inducing 
biasedness in the interest variable estimator due to the omission of an important variable. 
Subsection 3 details the Omitted Variable Bias (OVB) problem. 
According to Wooldridge (2009), while underspecifying the model can cause the 
OVB problem, overspecifying it would not generate biasedness in the estimators. In this 
sense, the demographic variables were included in the models. 
Demographic variables include the following information: 
(1) Age 
The age was calculated in years at the day of promotion to the rank of O-6. The 
sample presented an average of 47.0 years old with a standard deviation of 2.74.   
(2) Experience 
The variable exper was included in the models and refers to years in the FAB as 
officers (possible period spent in civilian labor market or other Armed Forces were not 
considered). The sample was in average 28.38 years of experience at the time of 
promotion to the rank of colonel and the standard deviation was 2.31. 
(3) Dependents 
The number of dependents was also considered at the promotion to rank of 
colonel. The sample average was 2.12 dependents per person with a standard deviation of 
1.22. 
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(4) Marital status 
Table 3 depicts how the sample was distributed in terms of marital status. In the 
equation, however, only one binary variable was generated. The variable married 
assumed the value of “1” whether the officer were married and “0” otherwise. 
(5) Religion 
Table 3 shows how the sample was distributed in terms of religion. The variables 
catholic, spiritualist, protestant, and other_religion were generated and assumed the 
value “1” whenever the colonel declared that faith and “0” otherwise. The variable 
other_religion refers to the people that left the information missing, declared being 
atheist, agnostic or other religions that are minorities in Brazil such as Jewish, Muslims, 
Buddhists, and other. The variable catholic was left out of regressions to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity.  
(6) Race 
Table 3 depicts how the races were distributed over the sample. Nonetheless, only 
one binary variable was generated in the equations. The variable white assumed the value 
of “1” if the officer were white and “0” otherwise. 
Table 3.   Demographic Characteristics 
Race Marital Status Religion 
White 79.83% Married 86.29% Catholic 70.08% 
Brown 10.71% Divorced 10.52% Other_religion 14.10% 
Other_race 8.01% Single 2.22% Spiritualist 9.36% 
Black 1.45% Widower 0.97% Protestant 6.47% 
 
Lastly, this research purposely did not control for gender and education 
attainment that some other studies proved important in determining the decision to leave 
the military. It is important to notice that in this specific population, these two variables 
 36 
were very uniform since the graduation education is prerequisite for reach the rank of 
colonel and, in the considered cohorts, females did not exist yet. 
3. Omitted Variable Bias 
As it was already stated, the selection for the CPEA, in accordance with FAB’s 
legislation, is done by an internal and meritocratic process, therefore it would be 
necessary to control for merit in order to extract the biasedness from the estimator β1. 
According Wooldridge (2009), when the equation leaves out an important 
variable, usually incurs in the problem of underspecification model, also known as 
omitted variable bias. 
For example, consider the following equation: 
𝑦𝑦 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥1 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝜇𝜇 
where due to the absence of information 𝑥𝑥2, build up the equation below underspecified: 
𝑦𝑦� = 𝛽𝛽�0 + 𝛽𝛽�1 𝑥𝑥1 
Note that the “til” was purposely placed in the estimators to establish that they 
belong to the underspecified equation. 
The development of the equation ends up with the following conclusion, 
according to Wooldridge (2009): 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵�𝛽𝛽�1� = 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽�1) −  𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿1 
In this way, 𝛽𝛽�1 will not be biased either if 𝛽𝛽2 or 𝛿𝛿1 were equal to zero, that is, in 
order to the coefficient of 𝑥𝑥1 will not be biased either if the effect of 𝑥𝑥2 over y should be 
null or if the correlation between 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 should be nonexistent. 
In the specific case of this research, our main objective is to discover what 
influence the selection to the CPEA has on the attrition of a colonel.  
Thus, we could define the equation below to deal with the research question:  
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ret3 = β0 + β1 cpea + ε 
To be sure that the estimator over cpea (β1) is not biased, one must certify that no 
variable correlated with CPEA that is also able to influence retention was left on the error 
term of the equation. To avoid the biasedness in the estimators, all the equations control 
for merit (lmr_points); once, according to the legislation, the CPEA selection process is 
meritocratic. Furthermore, the information about demographic variables that the 
institution stores are also controlled to avoid eventual prejudices interfere the estimators. 
B. MODELS SPECIFICATION 
Retention is a dichotomous variable that assumes the value of “1” whenever it 
succeeds and “0” when it fails. To estimate the probability of success of the event this 
study will use logit regressions, defined as: 
  𝜙𝜙(𝑦𝑦) = 1
1+𝑒𝑒−[𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥)]   (2) 
where 𝜙𝜙(𝑦𝑦) is the probability of “y” succeed given a set of x’s. 
As stated in the previous section, “y” was defined as ret3, which means it 
succeeds whenever the colonel remained in the active duty for a period superior to three 
years in the rank of O-6. Basically three equations (G(x) ) were developed to be plugged 
into Equation 2 and address the research questions and hypothesis stated in the previous 
chapters.  
1. Effect of the CPEA on Retention 
Equation 3 aims to verify the effect of the CPEA on retention. 
G(x) = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝜷𝜷1 cpea +𝛽𝛽2 lmr_points +𝛽𝛽3 age +𝛽𝛽4 exper +𝛽𝛽5 married +𝛽𝛽6 dependents +𝛽𝛽7 
white +𝛽𝛽8 other_religion +𝛽𝛽9 protestant +𝛽𝛽10 spiritualist + µ        (3) 
Since G(x) is not a linear function of y, but obeys Equation 2 , the 𝛽𝛽1 does not 
give the a straightforward interpretation of effects of the cpea on y, so after verifying 
whether 𝛽𝛽1 is statistically significant, I determine the marginal effect of the cpea on 
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retention differentiating Equation 2 with respect to x. The 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 gives the marginal effect of 
each variable on y. 
2. Different Effects of the CPEA on Retention Regarding Groups of 
Merit 
Equation 4 deals with interaction terms between cpea and group of merit to 
determine whether belonging to Group of Merit 1 has a different effect on retention with 
respect to cpea.  
G(x) = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝜷𝜷1 cpea_group1+𝜷𝜷2 cpea_groups2&3 +𝛽𝛽3 cpea +𝛽𝛽4 group1 +𝛽𝛽5 groups2&3 
+ 𝛽𝛽6 lmr_points +𝛽𝛽7 age +𝛽𝛽8 exper +𝛽𝛽9 married +𝛽𝛽10 dependents + 𝛽𝛽11 white+ 𝛽𝛽12 
other_religion  +𝛽𝛽13 protestant + 𝛽𝛽14 spiritualist + µ     (4) 
After testing the statistical significance of 𝛽𝛽1, I use Equations 2 and 4 to predict 
the likelihood of a white, married, catholic, 47 years old and with 28 years of experience 
with two dependents (the most probable case) to be retained after a three-year period. To 
verify the interaction term, I consider that he was qualified for the CPEA, in two different 
scenarios: (a) belonging to Group of Merit 1; and (b) not belonging to Group of Merit I. 
3. Different Effects of the CPEA on Retention Regarding Specializations 
Finally, Equation 5 aims to check whether the effect of cpea is different for 
aviators, in order to specifically address the hypothesis stated for research question 
number 3. 
G(x) = 𝛽𝛽0  +𝜷𝜷1 cpea_aviator +𝛽𝛽2 cpea + 𝛽𝛽3 aviator +𝛽𝛽4 lmr_points +𝛽𝛽5 age +𝛽𝛽6 exper  
+𝛽𝛽7 dependents +𝛽𝛽8 married +𝛽𝛽9 white +𝛽𝛽10 other_religion +𝛽𝛽11 protestant  
+𝛽𝛽12 spiritualist +µ        (5) 
In this last equation I checked for the statistical significance and direction of the 
interaction term (cpea_aviator). In this case, the colonel will also be considered selected 
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for the CPEA under the following two specific scenarios: (a) being an aviator, and (b) not 





This chapter presents the results for the various logistic regressions specified in 
the previous chapter. Section B is divided into three subsections to address each of the 
three research questions formulated in the first chapter of this study. Data collected from 
the Brazilian Air Force manpower databanks was used to verify whether there was 
statistical evidence to support the hypotheses developed regarding the CPEA selection 
process.  
The first question addresses the effect that selection of a colonel for the CPEA has 
on retention within the military. The second research question addresses the concerns of 
FAB manpower advisers that suspect the classification of colonels in different classes in 
terms of relative merit could be influencing the retirement decisions of the involved 
colonels. And finally, the third question examines whether CPEA selection has a different 
effect on retention by corps group. Knowing how different Corps respond to the same 
incentive (i.e., CPEA) will be useful, since the Air Force has the flexibility to establish 
different policies for different Corps. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESULTS 
1. RQ-1: What is the Effect of Being Selected for the CPEA on 
Retention? 
As previous studies suggest, the use of incentives has the potential to enhance 
positive outcomes, such as increase retention, for organizations. Although, the predicted 
response to incentives is not obvious, especially when considering NMIs, there are a 
series of nuances to be considered. However, the overall use of NMIs is expected to 
produce positive results, mainly for senior employees after their basic needs are satisfied. 
In this sense the first hypothesis proposed was the selection for the CPEA will increase 
retention rates. 
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To check the validity of this hypothesis and, more important, to estimate the 
extent of the effect of this incentive in terms of retention, the following logit regression 
was estimated using the FAB sample: 
ret3 = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝜷𝜷1 cpea +𝛽𝛽2 lmr_points +𝛽𝛽3 age +𝛽𝛽4 exper +𝛽𝛽5 married +𝛽𝛽6 dependents +𝛽𝛽7 
white +𝛽𝛽8 other_religion +𝛽𝛽9 protestant +𝛽𝛽10 spiritualist + µ       (3) 
where the coefficient of interest is on the variable cpea. Table 4 presents the predicted 
odds ratio for each of the independent variables in Equation 3. 
Table 4.   Odds Ratio of CPEA after Logit 
variable Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% C.I.] 
cpea 13.3276 2.520025 13.70 0.000 9.200345 19.30633 
lmr_points 1.000151 .0009399 0.16 0.872 .9983108 1.001995 
age .9908515 .0290248 -0.31 0.754 .9355661 1.049404 
exper 1.017808 .0358458 0.50 0.616 .949921 1.090546 
dependents 1.237625 .0829984 3.18 0.001 1.085189 1.411474 
married 1.968938 1.070783 1.25 0.213 .6781357 5.716728 
white 1.506182 .289472 2.13 0.033 1.033441 2.195175 
other_religion 1.525626 .4970242 1.30 0.195 .8056392 2.889055 
protestant 1.676758 .4779526 1.81 0.070 .9590456 2.93158 
_cons .0957463 .1954748 -1.15 0.251 .0017511 5.235127 
 
The regressions presented a predicted value of “y” for someone placed in X 
(middle of the curve) of 0.67187909. This implies that the predicted retention rate for an 
average colonel is 67%. This value is reasonable, given that the actual retention rate is 
64.77%. Of particular interest is the coefficient on CPEA. After controlling for variables 
listed above, the odds ratio of being selected for the CPEA is 13.33 (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). It means that those selected for the CPEA are 13 times more 
likely to remain on active duty, holding all the other factors constant. Other two variables 
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also presented statistical significance (white and protestant)4 but with more modest odds 
ratios. 
As expected, the estimated magnitude effect of being selected for the CPEA was 
large with a high level of statistical significance. Perfectly aligned with the studies 
reviewed in Chapter II, the NMIs are expected to enhance desirable outcomes for the 
organizations, mainly for senior employees who develop more complex tasks, and this is 
the specific case of the population on the scope. 
2. RQ-2: Is the Effect of CPEA Different for Colonels Classified in 
Different Groups of Merit? 
The second research question was proposed to verify the claim of manpower 
planners. They observe that even if selected for the CPEA, colonels present a significant 
attrition ratio and that it is reasonable to believe that the performance feedback provided 
by the performance appraisal system could be inducing perceptions and driving decisions 
about retirement. 
In fact, the promotion to the generalship is quite restrictive. It means the 
proportion of people being selected to the circle of general officers is low and the choice 
could depend on a series of factors. It makes sense to believe the rank in the LMR should 
be highly considered in a meritocratic system. Since the number of vacancies for 
promotion does not cover all the people in highest group, this study checks the following 
hypothesis: colonels belonging to Group 1 will respond better to the incentive 
(selection for the CPEA) compared to Group 2 and Group 3. 
Equation 4 presents the logit regression equation used to test the proposed 
hypothesis: 
ret3 =  𝛽𝛽0 +𝜷𝜷1 cpea_group1 +𝜷𝜷2 cpea_groups2&3+ 𝛽𝛽3 cpea+ 𝛽𝛽4group1+ 𝛽𝛽5 groups2&3 
+ 𝛽𝛽6 lmr_points +𝛽𝛽7 age +𝛽𝛽8 exper +𝛽𝛽9 married +𝛽𝛽10 dependents +𝛽𝛽11 white +𝛽𝛽12 other_ 
religion +𝛽𝛽13 protestant +𝛽𝛽14 catholic + µ        (4) 
4 The software omitted the variable “catholic” due to the model perfectly predicting the outcome of 
interest for this group. 
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In this case the primary variables of interest will be cpea_group1 and 
cpea_groups2&3. Both of these variables are interaction terms. The first (cpea_group1) 
refers to the colonels that simultaneously were chosen to do the CPEA and were 
classified in first tier in terms of group of merit. The second variable, similarly, is the 
interaction of being selected for the course and, at the same time, belonging to Groups 2 
or 3. The reference group is the group composed by colonels who were never classified in 
terms of group of merit and therefore never received this feedback.  
The statistical significance of these interaction terms determines whether the 
effect of one variable depends on the presence of the other. And this is the specific case 
that I check in this section, that is, whether being selected for the CPEA is important if 
the colonel were classified in Group 1. However, it is important to note that the partial 
effect that cpea has on retention for Group 1 is not solely the coefficient on the 
interaction term.  
Table 5 shows the odds ratio of each variable controlled in Equation 4 after logit 
regressions. As one can see, the interaction of CPEA and Group 1 has a statistically 
significant odds ratio, which suggests that one factor is important the presence of the 
other, regarding retention probabilities. In the other side, the interaction of CPEA and 
Groups 2 and 3 is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 5.   Odds Ratio of Interactions of CPEA and Groups of Merit 
ret3 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% C.I.] 
cpea 2.674778 .2799409 9.55 0.000 2.126104 3.223452 
group1 -1.560156 1.079827 -1.44 0.149 -3.676578 .5562656 
cpea#group1 2.192419 1.106616 1.98 0.048 .0234905 4.361347 
groups2&3 .4172133 .3269321 1.28 0.202 -.2235619 1.057988 
cpea#groups2&3 -.2750609 .4299104 -0.64 0.522 -1.11767 .5675481 
lmr_points -.0005877 .0011431 -0.51 0.607 -.0028281 .0016528 
age -.0103102 .0301987 -0.34 0.733 -.0694986 .0488781 
exper .0080566 .0359113 0.22 0.822 -.0623283 .0784415 
dependents .2058637 .0670524 3.07 0.002 .0744434 .3372839 
married .5524068 .5407187 1.02 0.307 -.5073824 1.612196 
white .4004281 .1920088 2.09 0.037 .0240978 .7767583 
other_religion .3968271 .3281897 1.21 0.227 -.246413 1.040067 
protestant .5244942 .2877059 1.82 0.068 -.039399 1.088387 
_cons -1.222046 2.251237 -0.54 0.587 -5.63439 3.190298 
 
a. Hypothesis Testing 
To verify whether the effect of CPEA on retention is greater for those in Group 1 
than Group 2&3, the following hypothesis was statistically tested. 
Ho: 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 
Ha: 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3 > 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 
which simplifies to: 
Ho: 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2  
Ha: 𝛽𝛽1 > 𝛽𝛽2  
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and can be rewritten as the following: 
Ho: 𝜷𝜷1 - 𝜷𝜷2 = 0 
Ha: 𝜷𝜷1 - 𝜷𝜷2 > 0 
The calculations showed that the z score of (𝛽𝛽1 - 𝛽𝛽2) is 2.09. 
Therefore it is possible to reject the null hypothesis and affirm (at 5% level of 
statistical significance) that the effect of belonging to Group 1 with respect to the CPEA 
is higher than the other two groups in fostering retention. 
In other words, the results shows that, even though the selection for the CPEA is 
an important factor to foster retention for all groups, the effect of this NMI on colonels 
belonging to Group 1 is higher than the effect of the incentive for the military belonging 
to the other two groups. 
The result directly addresses the question of manpower planners. Ultimately they 
wonder whether the attrition is a response for a non-selection for the CPEA or a response 
to not being well classified in terms of Relative Merit. Actually, the regressions showed 
that both factors play a role in retention. The interaction between cpea and group1 does 
exist and belonging to Group 1 enhances the effect of CPEA on retention. 
Appendix B shows the marginal effect of CPEA for each one of the three groups 
calculated separately and the respective standard errors. In the appendix, to hold the 
ceteris paribus condition, the marginal effects for the three groups were calculated for a 
white, Catholic, married, 47 years old, with two dependents and 28 years of experience in 
the military, which is the most expected profile of a colonel. For this profile of colonel, 
the predicted probability of “y” is 86.71% if the officer is classified in Group 1 and 
82.64% if classified in the other two groups. 
3. RQ-3: Does the Effect of Being Selected for the CPEA Differ across 
Corps? 
The last research question to be investigated in this study refers to possible 
differences that groups (different Corps) may present in response to a determined 
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incentive. According to the theory reviewed in Chapter II, the incentives are supposed to 
enhance positive organizational outcomes, but the response may vary across different 
classes of individuals, mainly when the opportunity costs are different for those classes. 
In the specific case of the Brazilian Air Force, decision-makers are required to 
establish policies regarding the selection for the CPEA, and these policies can and should 
be different for each Corps. Policymakers take actions to address the needs of the 
institution, and these needs are remarkably different as one can see in Table 2 presented 
in the previous chapter. The authorized billets for officers in the FAB shows that 64 out 
of 85 functions for general officers are reserved for aviators. Based on that 
disproportionality that makes the opportunity cost for aviators higher than for the other 
Corps, this study tests the hypothesis that aviators would respond better to the incentive 
in comparison to their peers. To check this hypothesis the following equation was 
specified: 
ret3 =  𝛽𝛽0 +𝜷𝜷1 cpea_aviators + 𝛽𝛽2cpea+ 𝛽𝛽3 aviator +  𝛽𝛽4 lmr_points  
+𝛽𝛽5 age +𝛽𝛽6 exper +𝛽𝛽7 married +𝛽𝛽8 dependents +𝛽𝛽9 white  +𝛽𝛽10 other_religion  
+𝛽𝛽11 protestant  +𝛽𝛽12 spiritualist + µ             (5) 
 
In the previous subsection (B-2), to compare two groups that received 
performance feedback, I used a group of colonels that never received that feedback as a 
reference group. But this is not the case in this subsection. To compare the two 
interaction terms (cpea_aviator and cpea_nonaviator), one of them (cpea_nonaviator) 
was omitted and the coefficient of the remaining was interpreted in relation to the omitted 
one. The coefficient of interest though is 𝛽𝛽1, which represents the interaction term of 
being an aviator and being selected for the CPEA. The odds ratio of the interaction term 




Table 6.   Odds Ratio of Interactions of CPEA and Corps 
ret3 Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% C.I.] 
cpea_aviator 2.046969 .7279588 2.01 0.044 1.019531 4.109813 
cpea 9.338373 2.414457 8.64 0.000 5.625889 15.5007 
aviator .4378837 .150007 -2.41 0.016 .2237487 .8569532 
lmr_points 1.000102 .0009453 0.11 0.914 .998251 1.001956 
age .9518129 .0389411 -1.21 0.227 .8784696 1.03128 
exper 1.007732 .0352652 0.22 0.826 .9409308 1.079276 
dependents 1.232654 .083028 3.11 0.002 1.080207 1.406617 
married 1.860489 1.017545 1.14 0.256 .6369206 5.434618 
white 1.470476 .2846323 1.99 0.046 1.006226 2.148922 
other_religion 1.504407 .4920951 1.25 0.212 .7923832 .856245 
protestant 1.675062 .4815474 1.79 0.073 .9535146 2.942623 
_cons 1.397877 3.680599 0.13 0.899 .0080216 243.5989 
 
It is important to remember, once again, that to interpret the interaction term, this 
ratio cannot be considered separately from the other factors of the interaction. However, 
it is possible to notice the term is statistically significant and greater than one, which 
confirms the hypothesis that the interaction between being an aviator and selected for the 
CPEA does exist and aviators respond better to the incentive (CPEA) than non-aviators.  
a. Hypothesis testing 
In the case of this interaction, the hypothesis testing is simple and straightforward. 
It refers only to check if the coefficient of the interaction term (𝜷𝜷1) is statistically 
significant. 
Ho: 𝜷𝜷1 = 0 
Ha: 𝜷𝜷1 > 0 
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𝛽𝛽1 presented a value of 0.7163601 with a standard error of 0.3556277 , what 
generated a z-score of 𝛽𝛽1/SE(𝛽𝛽1) = 2.01 , which permits to reject the null hypothesis and 
at 5% statistical significance states the effect of being an aviator with respect to the 
CPEA is greater than other Corps jointly, regarding the retention probabilities.  
Similar to what this study found regarding different groups of merit in the 
previous section, the effect of selection for the CPEA overall is relevant for all Corps. 
The regression also confirmed that an interaction between being an aviator and being 
selected for the CPEA does exist. It means that effect of the CPEA is important to foster 
retention in the different Corps, but it’s more effective for aviators. The result confirmed 
the hypothesis and did not cause any surprise, since, as far the evidence suggested, 
different classes of people are supposed to respond differently for a determined incentive 
and moreover the opportunity costs are expected to play a role in this interaction. As 
seen, the chances of promotion for aviators are remarkably higher in comparison to the 
other specialties what justifies that better response to the incentive.  
Appendix C shows the effect of CPEA for each one of the four specialties 
calculated separately. The regression for infantry was omitted, since the number of 
observations was not enough to provide statistical results. Similarly to what was done in 
Appendix B, the regressions for the different Corps was run considering a white, catholic, 
married, 47 years old, two dependents and with an experience of 28 years old in the Air 
Force, holding the ceteris paribus condition. The predicted probability of retention for a 
period superior to three years in the rank of colonel is 92.94% for the aviators and 
82.88% for the other Corps.   
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This research investigated the effect a career course (CPEA), defined in law as 
prerequisite for promotions to the ranks of generalship, exerts in retention of Brazilian 
Air Force colonels. It also searched to address the concerns of manpower planners who 
suspect the attrition rates of colonels could be the result of perceptions induced by the 
information provided by the Air Force as a title of performance feedback. And last, it 
checked whether colonels from different specializations responded differently to the same 
incentive. 
The study framed the problem over the Expectancy Theory and searched for 
characteristics of incentives to deal with the questions to be investigated. Two sources of 
data within the Brazilian Air Force were merged and analyzed using logit regressions and 
the discussion of the results are presented in the next section. 
The main goal of the study was to support the Brazilian Air Force with evidence, 
extracted from the data already existing, helping decision-makers in establishing 
appropriate policies regarding the CPEA selection process. Also, the study aimed 
contribute to the literature in providing information about how senior officers respond to 
a nonmonetary incentive in that specific culture and provide an insight about how 
perceptions influence this dynamic (incentive-retention). 
B. DISCUSSION 
1. Instrumentality 
The first and most important question investigated in this research was the effect 
of the selection for the CPEA in retention of colonels. As we have seen the CPEA’s 
selection is a merit-based process, which permitted me to frame it as an instrument for 
promotion. Indeed, throughout the years, some colonels had been cut from the course due 
to infrastructure limitations, and the criteria, according to internal regulations was merit. 
As we have seen, instrumentality refers to the belief that performance leads to the reward. 
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Since merit is just the reflex of the performance, and considering the CPEA is legally 
defined as a prerequisite for promotion, the non-selection for the course constitutes a 
break in instrumentality. 
The logit regressions proved with a high level of statistical significance that the 
selection for the CPEA is extremely strong in fostering retention. Economic theories go 
in the same direction suggesting the incentives are expected to increase positive 
organizational outcomes and NMIs are especially effective when applied for senior 
employees responsible for more complex tasks, where colonels can easily be framed on. 
Actually, this research revealed that colonels selected for the CPEA are 13 times more 
likely to stay in active duty after three years in the rank. This result is not at all surprising 
because selection for the CPEA keeps the officer in the race for promotion and it is also a 
recognition, while not being selected for the course eliminates any chance of promotion 
and acts as a demotivator factor. 
2. Expectancy 
The second point investigated refers to the concerns of manpower advisers, who 
suspect performance feedback provided by the system could be inadvertently inducing 
perceptions of promotions probability and therefore driving retirement decisions. The 
system used information about historical performance appraisals and delivered that 
information to the officers aiming to provide them conditions to improve future 
performance. 
Expectancy refers to the belief that an increase in effort could lead to an increase 
in performance. It is possible that colonels (far advanced in their military career and very 
close to the judgment for the generalship promotion) doubt the possibility of improving 
their efforts to a certain level that could be effective in reverting an unfavorable situation 
in a very short period of time (normally three or four years). 
Based on that reasoning, this study hypothesized that people not belonging to the 
best tier in terms of Group of Merit could have their expectancy broken and therefore 
should not respond as well to the incentive as their peers better classified in the LMR. 
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The regressions proved the existence of an interaction between the Group of Merit 
1 (better ranked in terms of punctuation in List of Relative Merit) and CPEA. That means 
one factor is important in the presence of another. In other words, the effect of CPEA is 
higher for people classified in Group 1. Economic studies found evidence that responses 
to incentives are complex and can vary across different population classes. For classes 
one should understand people with similar characteristics. It is reasonable to frame 
people belonging to the same Group of Merit as a class, since after receiving the same 
feedback of professional performance, they should nurture a very similar perception 
about career success. 
As Appendix B shows, the marginal effects of CPEA are slightly different across 
the three different tiers. This result addresses specifically the concerns of some 
manpower planners who wonder whether the decision to retire is driven by the LMR 
instead of the result of CPEA. This research, however, found that, even though the LMR 
plays a significant role, the result of CPEA is still strong. 
3. Valence 
Valence refers to whether a determined reward matches a personal goal. Indeed, it 
is expected that a person would keep pursuing a determined reward if this reward meets 
his or her personal goals. Recent studies suggested that some people value different 
outcomes (other than promotion and salary raise) regarding their professional life, such 
work/life balance, recognition, and others. 
To verify the hypothesis that some people did not value the promotion, I looked to 
the descriptive statistics and noticed that 12.75% of the colonels, even those selected for 
the CPEA and belonging to the Group of Merit 1, retired before completing three years in 
the rank of colonel. This means that even with good indications of promotion possibilities 
they prefer to retire, and this evidence fits the description of valence, which suggests 
individuals should value rewards differently. Economic studies also found evidence that 
individuals with similar characteristics should respond differently to the same incentive. 
As Coughlan et al. (2013) stated, “Individuals within a population class recognize that 
people in similar circumstances may still have different preferences” (p. 9), and 
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according to Visagie and Koekemoer (2014), “Although senior managers have general 
conceptualizations of what career success entails, they have unique personal meaning 
which they associate with their own career success” (p. 43). 
4. Other Issues Referring to Incentives 
This study also observed some other characteristics of incentives that go beyond 
the scope of expectancy theory. As studies pointed out, NMIs are effective as a part of a 
package reward but basic needs should be addressed first. As expected, this study shows 
that financial stability is very important in the decision to retire. Indeed, no single case of 
quitting in the rank of O-6 occurred in the nine cohorts analyzed, independent of the 
result of CPEA or classification in the LMR. Actually the quitting normally occurs in the 
beginning of the career.  
One final important point to be mentioned refers to the response of Corps to the 
incentives. The Air Force has the flexibility to adopt different policies for different Corps 
in order to attend the institution’s needs. According to the theory, different classes should 
respond different to incentives and as Appendix C showed, each Corps presented 
different responses to the CPEA regarding retention. 
Furthermore, as the study of Lakhani (1988) suggested, opportunity cost is 
important to consider when people face decisions about professional life. As expected, 
the aviators, who used to have better chances of promotion, presented a better response to 
the CPEA in relation to the other Corps. 
C. FUTURE STUDIES 
The current study used statistical analysis over data to provide useful information 
to manpower decision-makers in understanding behavior of colonels regarding their 
response to selection for the CPEA in terms of retention. The results of the econometric 
regressions provided useful information for manpower planners, but surely some other 
important questions can be addressed by future studies. As we have seen, data about 
gender were omitted. Women are gaining space in the Brazilian labor market and the 
same were observed in the Armed Forces. The first military women were recently 
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promoted to the rank of O-6 and are assuming important charges in the structure of the 
branches. Since no females were found in the records of the analyzed cohorts, future 
studies using similar methodology will be able to show the effect of gender on retention. 
A similar situation can apply to the infantry. As it was mentioned, the function of 
brigadier infantry in the Air Force was created in 2008, and consequently this specific 
Corps is still in the transitioning phase to adapt the career flow. Future studies will be 
able to state with more precision how infantry responds to incentives in terms of 
retention.  
Another point discussed in Chapter II refers to Expectancy Theory. In this study, I 
briefly presented the theory and assumed, based on the analysis of the data processed, the 
existence of the three links (expectancy, instrumentality, and valence). The direct 
interaction with people involved in the process, as made by De Oliveira et al. (2013) 
using surveys adapted to the scenario in focus, would bring better assessment of the 
strength of each link and could serve as model to predict retention as well. 
During this study, I also noticed that the ascension to the rank of colonel is vastly 
different across specializations. Deeper investigations about the reasons why it occurs 
were not taken, since the effect of the CPEA over retention only makes sense when 
investigating colonels; as it was stated in Chapter I, the CPEA is destined for the colonels 
belonging to the Corps with access to generalship. Nonetheless, future studies addressing 
the reasons why some officers seems do not even care about the promotion to the rank of 
O-6 could be welcome for the Brazilian Air Force administration and could lead to 
alternative solutions to the problem of shortage of colonels. 
One final point refers to opportunity cost. To offer a hypothesis regarding the 
response of different Corps, this study only considered the opportunities inside the 
institution (chances of promotion). Further studies could observe also the data from 
outside, such as unemployment rates and average salaries for each different profession in 
order to be more insightful in focusing a determined Corps. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the effect of the CPEA proved the 
NMI is extremely strong in promoting retention. This information can be very useful to 
manpower planners in optimizing the gaps of personnel when the number of colonels 
exceeds the number of vacancies. Once they know with higher precision the effect the 
CPEA has on retention, manpower planners can plug the numbers in formulas and 
determine the ideal number of colonels to be selected for the course in order to minimize 
the unfulfilled billets of colonels. 
The reasoning above, however, works only if the number of colonels and the 
boundaries for selection surpass the ideal number of officers to be selected for the CPEA. 
In this situation, limiting the number of people selected for the CPEA would provoke a 
“desirable” attrition to fit the existing colonels in organizational pyramid. However, 
having a shortage of colonels, the Air Force should consider the possibility of postponing 
the selection process (and consequently the course) in an attempt to increase the average 
time in the rank of O-6. It is important to remember, though, that a change in policy 
probably leads to a change in behavior. It means that not having information about the 
CPEA selection process does not necessary guarantee that the people would overall keep 
in active duty for three or four more years. Based on the assumption that perception is 
able to drive decisions, chances are that colonels would try to observe other indicators to 
“measure” their probabilities of promotion.  
The second finding of this study refers to the effect of performance feedback. As 
some manpower advisers suspected, it proved to play a role in the retirement decision. An 
alternative way to provide this feedback should be studied; informing the colonels what 
point they have room to improve, without highlighting what tier they belong to, may have 
a positive impact on retention. 
The results this research achieved is generalizable. Many Armed Forces in the 
world use courses to qualify their officers and improve the human capital of the 
organizations. The effect of the selection for the courses certainly will vary depending on 
the criteria and culture of each institution, but ultimately qualifying an officer for a 
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course increases the value of that asset. Therefore, whenever the selection for any course 
is able to foster this perception, it is likely to improve positive organizational outcomes. 
Finally, as mentioned by Visagie and Koekemoer (2014), recent studies have 
found (and it is also aligned with the definition of valence in the Vroom’s Expectancy 
Theory) that some people are likely to pursue different objectives in their professional 
life, other than promotion. The functions associated with the rank of colonel are very 
diversified and can provide numerous different opportunities. To cope with the FAB 
structure, colonels can exercise functions of command, staff, planning, attaché, and so on; 
and as far the theory goes, different people would prefer to develop different activities 
(such as leadership, advisory, projects, or diplomacy). Matching the right people in the 
right place should improve intrinsic motivation and reflect in retention. Understanding 
the individual differences and correctly managing these different “tastes” could be a way 
to a successful talent management in this critical moment of the career, when the officer 
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APPENDIX A  
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% C.I.] X 
cpea .5692401 .03263 17.45 0.000 .505292 .633188 .743389 
lmr_points .0000333 .00021 0.16 0.872 -.000373 .000439 1269.25 
age -.0020261 .00646 -0.31 0.754 -.014682 .01063 47.0025 
exper .0038913 .00776 0.50 0.616 -.011325 .019107 28.3914 
dependents .0470004 .01474 3.19 0.001 .018103 .075897 2.13908 
married .1302728 .08814 1.48 0.139 -.042469 .303015 .021548 
white .0936724 .04526 2.07 0.038 .004962 .182382 .804114 
other_religion .0866324 .06145 1.41 0.159 -.033804 .207069 .064643 
protestant .104784 .05229 2.00 0.045 .0023 .207268 .095005 
Number of obs   =       1021 
LR chi2(9)     =     279.95 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 














cpea 0.850*** 0.720*** 0.509** 
 (0.0747)  (0.0908)  (0.255)  
lmr_points 0.000114 -0.00144 0.000419 
 (0.00101)  (0.00165)  (0.00065)  
age -0.0459** -0.0066 -0.00243 
 (0.0187)  (0.0158)  (0.00899)  
exper -0.0108 0.0148 0.0246 
 (0.0183)  (0.019)  (0.0369)  
dependents 0.104 0.0294 0.0113 
 (0.064)  (0.0342)  (0.0224)  
married  0.111 -0.00764 
  (0.125)  (0.0794)  
white -0.106 0.0188 0.0779 
 (0.0717)  (0.0916)  (0.128)  
other_religion 0.0852 0.0794 -0.295 
 (0.0885)  (0.0896)  (0.362)  
protestant 0.0904 0.0756 0.00851 
 (0.0704)  (0.0912)  (0.0503)  
    
N 119 117 90 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; 
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cpea 0.505*** 0.416*** 0.341** 0.221 
 
(0.152) (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.281)  
lmr_points 9.83E-05 -0.00215** 0.000508 -0.0016 
 
(0.00011)  (0.00085)  (0.00042)  (0.00147)  
age 0.000936 0.0232 -0.0287 0.0278 
 
(0.00593)  (0.0279)  (0.0232)  (0.0237)  
exper -0.00308 -0.0923*** -0.00601 -0.114 
 
(0.00562)  (0.0345)  (0.0102)  (0.0738)  
dependents 0.00746 0.165** 0.0408 0.086 
 










white 0.0699 0.073 -0.016 0.174 
 
(0.0515)  (0.184)  (0.0435)  (0.205)  
other_religion 0.0223 -0.0747 0.0449 0.287 
 







(0.0573)  (0.37)  
 
    
N 613 81 240 64 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*p>0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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